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Abstract 
In this paper I address two issues pertaining to the market differentiation between 
non-genetically modified (non-GM) and genetically modified (GM) food varieties. First, 
I provide a cost-efficiency explanation of the discrepancy between the observed shares of 
identity preserved non-GM variety and the total supply of the variety. Second, I show that 
when products can be falsely labeled as non-GM, the share of false labeling depends on 
the level of identity preservation. In this context, I demonstrate that the share of falsely 
labeled supply can increase in response to harsher fines. 
 
Key words: acreage allocation, credence attributes, food labeling, identity preservation, 
market differentiation. 
  
 
 
IDENTITY PRESERVATION AND FALSE LABELING  
IN THE FOOD SUPPLY CHAIN 
Introduction 
 In the face of persistent consumer resistance, the wide adoption of biotechnology 
appears to stimulate the bulk commodity system of agricultural grain trading to split 
between traditional and genetically modified (GM) product varieties. Crop segregation 
and identity preservation (IP) practices are used to accommodate the emerging market 
differentiation between the products according to the GM content (e.g., Lin, Chambers, 
and Harwood 2000). An interesting feature of this process is an apparent discord between 
the share of acres sown to non-GM crops and the share of non-GM crops that are 
processed through IP. While the upper limits for the potential market shares of non-GM 
corn and soybeans in the United States in 1999 were estimated at 37 percent and 31.6 
percent, respectively, the actual demand was much smaller (Babcock and Beghin 1999). 
For example, only a fraction of an estimated 4 percent of total corn production in 1998–
2000 that was identity preserved was certified as non-GM (Palmer 2001). According to a 
survey by the U.S. Grains Council, this figure was less than 3 percent in 2000 with a 
slight discrepancy between the responses from farmers and elevators (AgJournal 2001).1 
In contrast, depending on the crop, between 50 percent and 70 percent of the U.S. acreage 
was sown to non-GM varieties of soybeans and corn in the period 1998–2001. 
 This implies that the supply of non-GM varieties could fetch only a minor premium 
at harvest because it apparently has exceeded the derived demand for non-GM varieties.2 
This was, in fact, the case, as an estimated historical price premium for non-GM varieties 
amounted to less than 2 percent to 4 percent of the average price received by U.S. farmers 
(European Commission 2000, USDA 2000). 3 If, indeed, GM varieties are credited with 
offering a cheaper production technology, then low average premiums received for non-
GM varieties, at least ex post, do not appear to be sufficient to warrant the costlier 
production.4 In this paper, I propose a production cost efficiency argument that may 
contribute to explaining the observed breach between the production decisions at the 
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growing and processing stages of the U.S. food supply chain. I also consider how the 
possibility of false labeling alters the incentives of the players in agricultural markets. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The first main section highlights some 
important features of the emerging market differentiation and the essence of the cost 
efficiency argument. In the second main section, the formal model is developed. After 
describing the production and consumption environments, I define and characterize the IP 
cost efficient equilibrium. Next, I explore some properties of a constrained IP cost efficient 
equilibrium and discuss principal assumptions underpinning the analysis. In the third main 
section the set of food marketing strategies is extended to include false labeling, and some 
of the properties of the equilibrium share of false labels are investigated. 
 
Theoretical Structure 
 Food Chain and Market Differentiation. On the demand side, consumers’ value of 
input-trait GM varieties is, on average, lower than that of non-GM counterparts. On the 
supply side, growing and segregating non-GM varieties typically involves greater 
production expenses than does growing GM varieties. The trade-off between output 
prices and production costs has been proposed as the main motive behind the incomplete 
adoption of GM varieties (Saak and Hennessy 2002). Building on their approach, I will 
detail the origin of the demand that growers face at harvest. In a perfectly competitive 
environment, I consider a two-stage production process. In the first stage, a fixed stock of 
land is allocated between GM and non-GM varieties. The decision to invest in the IP 
processing is made in the second stage, when the crops are sold to processors.  
 Identity Preservation and Production Externalities. The unit cost of IP is likely 
to be subject to two types of production externalities. When the share of non-GM variety 
at harvest increases, the average IP cost may fall due to a lower probability of 
commingling as well as search and transportation costs. Note that, in the extreme case, 
when no GM variety is supplied at harvest, the cost of IP is zero. For precisely the same 
reasons, IP processing may tend to be more expensive when the share of IP increases. 
The marginal cost of IP escalates to infinity when IP processors demand all non-GM 
variety. In contrast, as specialized marketing channels emerge, it seems probable that 
economies of scale work to reduce the unit cost of IP (e.g., Lin, Chambers, and Harwood 
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2000). In what follows, both possibilities will be considered. But for now consider that 
the average cost of IP is lower when only part of non-GM variety is IP processed rather 
than when the entire supply of the variety is IP processed.5 
 Efficient Allocation and Competitive Markets. Therefore, competitive markets 
face the following efficient allocation problem. On the one hand, non-GM growers 
impose a positive externality on IP processors when supply of non-GM variety exceeds 
demand. In contrast, a premium for non-GM variety emerges only if all of the variety is 
demanded for IP processing. Therefore, non-GM growers never choose to produce any 
“excess” amount of non-GM variety. However, as will be shown, competitive markets 
can achieve the efficient allocation through randomization that, at least partially, 
internalizes the production externalities described above. Namely, competitive markets 
can oscillate between two equilibria: one where only a part of non-GM variety is IP, and 
the other where all of the variety is IP processed. Then, on average, non-GM growers 
receive a premium; therefore a “sufficient” supply of non-GM variety is secured. And so, 
IP processing costs are reduced when the share of IP is small relative to supply. Next, I 
describe the demand environment that is likely to support such randomization. 
 Premium for Identity Preserved Food Products. Observe that when only part of 
non-GM variety is processed through IP, a given non-IP product may turn out to contain 
very little GM material. Therefore, consumers must value non-IP products more than 
pure GM food products. As the share of IP processed non-GM variety increases, two 
things happen. On one hand, the price of IP products declines because the aggregate 
demand schedule is downward sloping. On the other hand, there are fewer chances that a 
non-IP food product is free of genetically modified organisms (GMO), which implies that 
its value to consumer falls as well. Hence, in general, the price premium for IP non-GM 
variety can actually rise when the level of IP increases. Under certain conditions on the 
distribution of tastes toward GM food among the population and the average cost of IP, 
this will be shown to generate multiple equilibria in the processing stage. Then the event 
that non-GM growers receive a premium becomes uncertain, given that other equilibrium 
outcomes are possible.  
 Labeling of Identity Preserved Products. Since the GM content of a final food 
product typically is a credence attribute, differentiation between IP and non-IP products 
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at the retail level is performed through non-GMO labeling (e.g., Caswell and Mojduszka 
1996).6 On the legal side, as of the beginning of 2001, sections 403 and 201(n) of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (the act) govern the labeling of foods and defined 
false and misleading labeling. Draft Guidance released in January 2001 by the U.S. Food 
and Drug Administration specified that “the fact that a food or its ingredients was 
produced using bioengineering is a material fact that must be disclosed under sections 
403(a) and 201(n) of the act” and “[does] not require special labeling of all bio-
engineered foods.”7 As a result, some food producers adopted a voluntary practice of 
labeling their food products indicating the GM content.  
 Cases of false labeling in organic food markets are widely documented (e.g., see 
McCluskey 2000 and references therein). Similarly, “non-GMO” or “GMO-free” types of 
labels may inaccurately reflect the percentage of modified genes contained in a food item. 
For example, according to Callahan and Kilman (2001), about 40 percent of soybean 
DNA in a sample of “non-GMO” veggie bacon produced by Yves Veggie Cuisine, a 
Canadian maker of vegetarian dishes, was found to be genetically modified. These 
authors document a number of other cases of misrepresentative “GMO-free” labeling.
 Ex ante and Ex post False Labeling. Generally, two distinct approaches can be 
used to define false labeling (Wittman 1977). An ex ante definition of false labeling is 
more restrictive. It states that a label is false if a food item is labeled as non-GMO 
without the exact knowledge that the item has GM content not exceeding the tolerance 
level. Therefore, even if a product happens to be GMO free, this kind of labeling is 
considered an act of cheating. According to the ex post definition, a product is falsely 
labeled as non-GMO only if it is revealed to possess a GM substance. Both definitions 
have their virtues and drawbacks. On one hand, the ex post definition is more internally 
consistent with the assumption of risk-neutral consumers which is adopted in this paper.8 
On the other hand, the ex ante definition is likely to be more appealing in real world 
situations.9 It will be shown that the recommendations for anti-false labeling policies are 
likely to differ somewhat depending on the definition used. 
 Therefore, in the second part of the paper, I extend the choices available to retailers to 
include false labeling.10 When the penalty for false labeling is low and labels are difficult to 
verify, some non-IP processors may label their products as non-GMO. The possibility of 
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making false non-GMO claims effectively puts a cap on the revenues earned by the IP non-
GMO food suppliers. I derive some interesting comparative statics pertaining to the 
relationship between the extent of false labeling and the expected penalty. 
 
Model of Market Differentiation 
 There are three time points of interest: 1, 2, and 3. The farmers plant two varieties of 
crops, GMO (G) and non-GMO (N) at time 1. At time 2, the retailers buy the crops from 
the farmers and process them into final food products whose identity (N or G) is not 
known to consumers unless products are certified as IP.11 IP type N and non-IP 
(unlabeled) food items are sold to consumers at time 3. The timing of production and 
consumption decisions is illustrated in Figure 1. 
Demand Side 
 Following Saak and Hennessy (2002), all consumers are held to have unit demands 
and consume, at most, one type of (food) product. A type e  consumer’s preferences for 
consumption of one unit of type N food, 1=Nt , or a unit of type G food, 1=Gt , are 
given by 
î
í
ì
=
=
=
}1,0{},{ if ,
}0,1{},{ if ,1
),,(
GN
GN
GN tt
tt
ttU
e
e . 
 
 
 
Time 1  
Planting Harvest and IP Consumption 
Time 2  Time 3  
 
FIGURE 1. Timing of events 
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That is, any consumer derives unit gross utility from consuming a unit of N. The utility 
derived from consuming a unit of G differs across consumers and is equal to the 
consumer’s type [0,1]e Î .12 The distribution of types among the consumers is given by 
a continuous, strictly increasing cumulative distribution function ( )H e , where 
(0) 0H =  and (1) 1H = . An inverse of function ( )H ze =  always exists   z [0,1]" Î , 
and is given by ( )J ze = . Furthermore, assume that the consumer’s utility is quasi-
linear in a numéraire good. 
 Consumers cannot differentiate between type N and type G food products unless 
they are labeled as such. Since labeling is voluntary, only IP type N products are labeled. 
For now, false labeling is assumed away. However, if a product is not labeled and not all 
of variety N is processed through IP, consumers do not know whether the food is of type 
N, or of type G. Type e  consumers who consider purchasing an unlabeled product 
rationally estimate their gross utility of consumption as 
)Unlabeled|G typePr()Unlabeled|N typePr(1 ×+× e . 
Under certain conditions on the inverse demand (.)J , a consequence of this assumption 
is the price premium for IP type N food that is an (locally or globally) increasing function 
of the supply of IP type N products.  
Supply Side 
 Both the raw crop and food retail markets are perfectly competitive. At time 1, the 
homogenous and risk-neutral farmers allocate a fixed stock of land between the two 
varieties N and G. The stock of land is normalized to 1 and per acre yield is constant, 
invariant across varieties, and is also normalized to 1. The share of land planted to variety 
N is given by ]1,0[Îx . Then the crop of variety N (G) available at harvest time 2 is 
given by x  ( x-1 ). Unit production costs of varieties N and G are given by nc  and gc , 
where gn cc > .13 
 At time 2, after the harvest, farmers sell their crops to the fixed number of 
homogenous and risk-neutral retailers and receive farm-gate prices nf  and gf  for 
varieties N and G, respectively.14 While some retailers decide to supply the IP type N 
food, others choose not to invest in the IP program. A share of variety N ],0[ xs Î  
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processed through IP is established at time 2. The unit cost of IP is given by ),( sxc , 
which is continuous, twice differentiable in each argument function and is subject to the 
two types of production externalities discussed previously. I hold that the unit cost of IP 
declines in the supply of variety N, 0),( £sxcx , and increases in the share of identity 
preserved variety N, 0),( ³sxcs  where the subscripts denote differentiation.
15 
 I do not consider the possibility of a “contaminated” non-biotech variety due to 
cross-pollination between GM and non-GM varieties. Also, only expensive tests (a part 
of the IP costs) or costly monitoring of the grower’s production methods can be used to 
ascertain the crop variety. Hence, the retailers who do not invest in the IP program do not 
know what crop variety they bought from the farmers.16 This implies that the non-IP 
suppliers do not differentiate between the two crop varieties and always purchase the 
cheaper one. 
 The cost of IP at time 3 is prohibitively high. Therefore, those retailers who do not 
invest in the IP program do not know with certainty the GM content of their final food 
products. At time 3, retailers sell labeled type N (IP) and unlabeled (non-IP) food 
products to consumers for prices lp  and ulp , respectively. Neither retailers nor farmers 
can distinguish between the consumers of different types, and no arrangements between 
the suppliers and consumers can be made prior to time 3. 
Game Tree of Market Differentiation 
 As will become clear in what follows, in general, an extensive-form game for the 
market differentiation between varieties N and G looks as shown in Figure 2. In Figure 2, 
the last four rows of the market differentiation game tree are the payoffs (i.e., per unit 
profits) to growers and retailers. There can be multiple equilibrium values of s . In an 
equilibrium with xs < , the price of variety N, nf , is bid down to gf  because non-IP 
retailers do not differentiate between the two varieties. However, there must be a strictly 
positive probability, p , that equilibrium with xs =  takes place because gn ff >  only if 
IP retailers buy all of variety N. Otherwise, variety N growers never receive a premium, 
and hence, no variety N is planted.17 
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FIGURE 2. Two-stage game of market differentiation 
 
 
 To analyze this game, I will employ the concepts of Nash equilibrium and subgame 
perfect Nash equilibrium. Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium will be found by backward 
induction. Since all players act competitively, this simply amounts to determining the 
competitive (Nash) equilibrium at each stage of the game given that players correctly 
anticipate the equilibrium outcomes in the following stages. 
Retail Market at Time 3 
 At the end of time 3, the share of variety N, x , and the share of IP products, s , are 
fixed. By the law of large numbers, the probability that a non-IP food product belongs to 
variety G, q , can be found as 
 )1/()1(}Unlabeled|G typePr{),( sxsxq --== . (1) 
Then, a type e  consumer utility is given by 
 ,1max[)( lpU -=e ]1)1( ulpqq -×+×- e . (2) 
The threshold type *e  that is indifferent between purchasing a unit of the labeled and 
unlabeled product is determined by 
 qp /1* -=e , (3) 
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where ull ppp -= . Observe how the price differential, p , that governs the consumer 
choice between the two products is “marked up” by the probability that a non-IP product 
belongs to type G food, q . Equilibrium in the retail market is then given by 
 sH =)( *e , (4) 
where the superscripted “*” denotes the equilibrium values. Substitute (7) into (8) and 
take the inverse to obtain 
 ))(1)(,(* sJsxqp -= . (5) 
 The right-hand side of (5) may be non-monotone in s  under certain assumptions on 
the curvature of )(sJ . The price premium paid for type N food is a product composed of 
two terms: ),( sxq  and )(1 sJ- , so that a small increase in s  has, in general, an 
ambiguous effect. On one hand, as the share of IP products rises, the supply of non-IP 
products becomes less valuable because ),( sxq  increases with s . On the other hand, the 
inverse demand for type N food decreases with s . Intuitively, these are the two forces 
that compete with each other.  
Raw Crop Market and Segregation at Time 2 
 At time 2, the unit profit from selling the IP (labeled) product is given by 
 nl fsxcp -- ),( , (6) 
while the unit profit from selling a non-IP (unlabeled) product is given by 
 gul fp - . (7) 
 At time 2, the share of variety N processed in isolation from variety G adjusts until 
the profit from IP processing is equated to the profit from supplying products with an 
unknown GM content. Equating the profit earned by IP retailers, (6), with that accrued to 
non-IP retailers, (7), and substituting the time 3 equilibrium price premium, (5), yields 
the following conditions describing the market equilibrium at time 2: 
 ),())(1)(,( sxcsJsxq £- , 0)( * =- gn ff , if xss <=* , (8a) 
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 *)(),()(1 gn ffxxcxJ -+=- , if xs =* . (8b) 
As mentioned previously, it is impossible that gn ff <  in equilibrium because there 
would be an excess supply of variety G. Also, note that if xs <*  then it must be that 
gn ff =  because, otherwise, there would be an excess supply of variety N. It must be 
the case that gn ff ³  if xs =*  in equilibrium at time 2. 
 In general, (8a), when it holds with equality, can have multiple solutions. By 
inspection, the following lemma that gives sufficient conditions for the existence of 
multiple equilibria is obtained. 
 LEMMA 1. For any )1,0(Îx  there are at least three equilibrium values of IP: 
0* =s , ),0(* xs Î , and xs =*  if )(1),()0,(1 xJxxcxcx -<<<- . 
 In what follows, time 2 equilibrium with 0* =s  is dismissed. Let }{ is , Ni ,...,2=  
where xs =1 , denote the set of equilibrium values of 
*s , i.e., positive solutions to (8a). 
In light of the lemma, make the following assumption.  
 ASSUMPTION 1. The share of variety N processed through IP, *s , is a random 
variable with the discrete probability distribution: iss =
*  with probability ip , 
Ni ,...,2,1= , å = =
N
i i1
1p . 
 Then the expected unit cost of IP is given by å ==
N
i ii
sxcsxcE
1
* ),()],([ p  where the 
expectation operator is taken with respect to random variable *s . I now proceed to 
characterize equilibrium at planting. 
 Equilibrium at Planting Time 1  
 At time 1, the acres sown to variety N adjust until the expected net revenues per acre 
from planting varieties N and G are equal: 
 ][][ ggnn cfEcfE -=- . (9) 
In other words, the expected price premium paid for variety N at harvest must be equal to 
the production cost differential delivered by variety G, fgn ccc =- . Using (8b), obtain 
the following condition characterizing the equilibrium value, *x : 
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 fcxxcxJ =-- 1
*** )),()(1( p .  (10) 
To guarantee the uniqueness of *x , the following assumption is required:  
 ASSUMPTION 2. ),(),( xxcxxc xs -³  )1,0(Î"x . 
Under assumption 2, for fixed 1p , the left-hand side (LHS) of (10) is decreasing in x . 
Now the IP cost efficient (IPCE) competitive equilibrium can be defined. 
Identity Preserved Cost Efficient Competitive Equilibrium 
 The following definition demonstrates how the considerations of the production cost 
efficiency of IP in a competitive equilibrium may lead to optimal randomization between 
processing all and a part of variety N.  
 DEFINITION 1. The IPCE equilibrium in the market-differentiation game is the pair 
),( ** sx  such that  
 fcxxcxJ =-- 1
*** )),()(1( p  (equilibrium acreage allocation at time 1); 
 ),())(1)(,( ** iii sxcsJsxq =-  Ni ,...,2=  (equilibria with low level of IP at time 2); 
 å ==
N
i ii
sxcsxcE
i
1
*** ),(min)],([ p
p
 (expected unit IP cost is minimized); 
where N  is the number of distinct solutions }{ is  taking 
*x  as given. 
 In general, the IPCE equilibrium can be viewed as a constrained optimization 
problem.18  Here the focus is on the equilibrium where the cost structure of IP dictates 
that *s  “mimics” the behavior of a non-degenerate random variable. The following 
provides sufficient conditions such that this happens.19 
  Result 1. Let the condition in lemma 1 hold. Then 11 <p  in the IPCE equilibrium if 
0),(),( =+ xxcxxc sx  )1,0(Î"x .  
 The condition in result 1 precludes the variation in the supply of variety N at harvest 
from affecting the cost of IP when all of the variety is IP processed. The next result 
characterizes the equilibrium probability distribution of *s  when randomization is 
optimal. 
 Result 2. The IPCE equilibrium probability distribution of *s  is two-mode: 
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î
í
ì
=
p
p
-s
x
s
1y probabilitwith ,
y probabilitwith ,** , 
where }{min ii ss = . 
 The expected unit cost of IP is minimized when the share of IP oscillates between the 
lowest and the highest equilibrium shares of IP. This is so because 0³sc  is assumed. So 
far the optimal probability distribution of *s has been considered, taking for granted that 
competitive markets can always “support” the randomization. Relaxing this assumption is 
the subject of the next section. 
Fixed Probabilities 
 Hypothetically, the IPCE equilibrium can be supported if growers and retailers 
observe some random event and have the equilibrium share of variety N processed 
through IP depend on the realizations of this event. However, due to the difficulties in 
coordination across the two markets, the optimal IPCE probability distribution of *s  may 
not be sustainable. Consider here a version of a “constrained” IPCE competitive 
equilibrium where the probabilities, jp , Nj ,...,1= , are taken as given. 
 Then the question arises how the supportable probability distributions of *s , with 
][ *sE  fixed, can be compared in terms of the expected unit cost of IP. Observe that the 
fixity of ip  implies that 
*x  is fixed as well. However, it is no longer required that 
0),( ³sxcs . Then, under plausible conditions there may be an even larger variety of 
equilibrium shares of IP }{ is , Mi ,...,2=  where MN < . To provide a partial ordering 
on this set, pick two alternative candidates }{ is  and }{ is¢ , Ni ,...,2,1= , where both 
sequences are ordered in a decreasing order. Note that *11 xss =¢= . The following 
definition is needed. 
 DEFINITION 2. (Cheng 1977) Let åå == ¢£
k
i ii
k
i ii
ss
11
pp  for 1,...,2,1 -= Nk , and 
åå == ¢=
N
i ii
N
i ii
ss
11
pp . Then sequence }{ is  is said to be p -majorized by sequence }{ is¢ , 
written as }{}{ ii ss ¢pp , for arbitrary )1,0(Îip . 
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 The notion of p -majorization compares two sequences in terms of “weighted” 
dispersion. By Corollary A.7 in Marshall and Olkin (1979, p. 421), ),...,,( 21 NsssV  
å ==
N
i ii
sxc
1
),(p  is a generalized Schur-convex (Schur-concave) function, and it 
increases (decreases) in the p -majorization order when ),( sxc  is convex (concave) in 
the second argument. 
 Result 3. For arbitrary probabilities ip  with 01 >p , let }{}{ ii ss ¢pp . Then 
)],([ * sxcE  )],([)( * sxcE ¢³£  as 0)(),( £³sxcss  )1,0(Î"x , ),0( xs Î" . 
 Result 3 is based essentially on a discrete version of the notion of mean-preserving 
spread (contraction) of a probability distribution. Thus, the expected unit cost of IP 
decreases (increases) under a more “dispersed” distribution of equilibrium shares of IP if 
the unit cost of IP, ),( sxc , is a convex (concave) function of s . This result can be 
generalized in an obvious manner using standard notions of second-order stochastic 
dominance. 
 The following section discusses some assumptions necessary for the existence of the 
IPCE and “constrained” IPCE competitive equilibrium. 
Other Reasons for the Existence of Multiple Equilibria 
 In the preceding analysis, multiple levels of *s  that leave retailers indifferent 
between processing or not processing through IP exist, in part, because the price 
premium, p , is a (locally) increasing function of s . On the other hand, this condition is 
neither sufficient nor necessary when there are positive production externalities due to 
economies of scale in IP processing. While it seems likely that ),( sxc  is decreasing in the 
first argument and increasing in the second, other situations are possible. As was 
discussed in the introduction, for example, due to economies of scale and specialization, 
the industry-wide unit cost of IP may fall when the share of IP processing rises. Some 
recent improvements in GMO testing procedures illustrate how an emerging demand for 
IP technologies can lower the cost of production. 
 If such positive production externalities do pertain to the IP sector, then the presence 
of imperfect information that leads to the non-monotonicity of the price premium is no 
longer necessary to generate the multiple equilibria. In other words, the assumption that 
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IP preserves a credence quality of a product can be dispensed with. Then the equilibrium 
conditions that determine the level of IP, is , that is less then the supply of variety N, 
*x , 
are given by 
),()(1 * ii sxcsJ =- , Ni ,...,2=  
fcxxcxJ =-- 1
*** )),()(1( p , 
where *xsi <  and ),(),(
*** xxcsxc i > . 
 On the other hand, contractual arrangements between growers and retailers may 
provide another vehicle for reducing IP costs. Producers’ choice to plant and supply IP 
variety N through contracts rather than using “spot” market transactions is considered next.  
Contractual Arrangements 
 To fix ideas, assume that a contract agreement specifies the premium paid to variety 
N grower upon the delivery. Let the unit cost of IP processing under contract be given by 
cc . Hold that for each )1,0(Îx  there exists ),0(ˆ xs Î  such that ccsxc £),(  for all 
ss ˆ,0(Î ) and ccsxc ³),(  for all ],ˆ[ xss Î . In other words, the unit cost of IP processing 
under contract is higher when the share of IP is small. However, the situation is reversed 
when the share of IP is high. This may happen when the processing under contract pays 
off when the supply of variety N is tight relative to demand due to, say, increased search 
and transportation costs associated with buying variety N in the cash market. 
 Then, at time 1, retailers face three alternative strategies: (a) supply IP products 
without contracts with growers, (b) supply IP products using contracts with growers, and 
(c) supply non-IP products. Similarly, growers can choose among three options: (a) plant 
variety N and sell it in the spot market, (b) plant variety N under contract, and (c) plant 
variety G. Assume that planting variety N under contract does not impose on growers any 
additional costs. This, of course, implies that risk-neutral growers using contracts will 
demand a premium no less than the expected premium offered by the spot market. 
 Assume that the expectation of the unit profits from all three activities taken with 
respect to random variable *s  adjusts so that retailers and growers are indifferent 
between the three strategies.20  This can be stated as follows: 
][][]),([ ** gulnclnl fpEfcpEfsxcpE -=--=-- , or 
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 )],([ ** sxcEcc = . (11) 
Even though the share of IP retailers who use contracts is not determined, assume that it 
is in the interval }){min,0( ii s .
21  Therefore, the presence of contractual arrangements 
establishes an upper bound on the expected unit cost of IP. 
 The previous analysis is based on the assumption that non-GMO labeling is always 
accurate. Then there is only one source of imperfect information: consumers do not know 
the exact GM content of non-IP (unlabeled) products. The possibility of falsifying the 
non-GMO certification process leads to information asymmetry where consumers know 
less than retailers do about the likely GM content of a labeled product. The rest of the 
paper explores the mechanics of the market differentiation when both sorts of imperfect 
information are present.22 
False Labeling 
 Penalty for False Labeling. Now hold that non-IP food products can be labeled as 
type N, and so false labeling can take place. Both a non-GMO identity-preserved (IP) 
product and an uncertified product can be labeled as type N at no cost. The share of the 
labeled food products is given by ]1,[sl Î  so that, in addition to the IP type N food, some 
processors may market food products with an unknown GM content under a non-GMO 
label. If discovered, false labeling is subject to a legal liability and penalty, F . For 
concreteness, hold that only ex post false labeling can be detected, i.e., only food items 
labeled as type N but actually belonging to type G can be spotted.23 Further assume that 
the government or consumer groups have a success rate ]1,0[Îa 24 of discovering such 
cases of cheating. Then the probability that a retailer will be caught is calculated as 
),( sxqa , and the expected penalty is given by25 
 FsxqF ),()retailer IP-non|Detected is FraudPr( =× , (12) 
where FF a= . 
 Assume that a  and F  are set at the beginning of time 1 and are used by the food 
manufacturers to estimate the expected fine. 
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Consumer Behavior When Labels Can Be False 
 In general, there are two ways in which a non-GMO labeled food product can turn 
out to be type N. It can be IP from the beginning and then there is lsqa /=  chance that 
the label is not false.26  Or, even though the label is false and the IP guidelines were not 
followed, the product can be type N food anyway. The probability of the latter is equal to 
]1[ aq- ]1[ q-× . The last expression implies that two events happen. First, the label is ex 
ante false. Second, given that the product is non-IP, it can happen that variety N crop was 
“accidentally” used to derive that product. The probability that a labeled product truly 
belongs to type N food is then given by 
=- )GMOnon  as  Labeled|Pr( Nt ]1[]1[ qqq aa -×-+ . 
The probability that a labeled product is a type G food is given by 
=- )GMOnon  as  Labeled|Pr( Gt qqa ×- ]1[ . 
This expression has a similar interpretation. As previously noted, the probability that an 
unlabeled product is, in fact, of type N is given by q-1 . The only piece of information 
conveyed by the absence of a label is the fact that the product is, certainly, non-IP. 
Observe that it is always the case that ) Unlabeled|Pr() Labeled|Pr( NN tt > , i.e., the 
non-GMO labeled product is always more valuable to consumers. 
 Even though consumers have no way of telling a true label from a false one without 
a costly verification procedure, they rationally anticipate that a label can be false. Then, a 
type e  consumer utility is given by 
 ,)1(1)}1)(1(max[{ laaa pqqqqq -×-+×--+ e ]1)1(
ulpqq -×+×- e . (13) 
In the manner of (3), the threshold type *e  that is indifferent between purchasing a unit 
of the labeled and unlabeled product can be found as 
 ]/[1* qqp a-=e . (14) 
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Observe that now the surplus of consumers who buy type N food is “marked up” by both 
the probability that a labeled product is IP and by the probability that a non-IP product 
belongs to type G. 
Equilibrium Supply of Type N Labeled Product 
 Because consumers can only differentiate between labeled and unlabeled products, 
equilibrium in the retail market is given by 
 lH =)( *e . (15) 
Then the equilibrium price premium can be found as 
 ))(1)(,(),(* lJsxqlsqp a -= . (16) 
Observe that (5) is a particular case of (16) with sl =  s " , i.e., when no false labeling 
occurs. Turning to the supply side, the expected (average) unit profit accrued to non-IP 
retailers who label their products as type N is given by 
 Fsxqp l ),(- . (17) 
The equilibrium amount of the labeled product, *l , will adjust until non-IP retailers are 
indifferent between marketing their products as type N or non-IP:  
 pFsxqp l =- ),( , if sl >* ; (18a) 
 pFsxqp l <- ),( , if sl =* . (18b) 
Substituting  (16) into (18), we find the equilibrium price premium for the labeled food: 
 ] ),(1min[),( *** FsJsxqp -= ,  (19) 
where FlJlsqa =- ))(1)(,(
*** , if ** sl > , and we take that 1<F  since otherwise the 
prospect of getting caught and fined completely eliminates any fraudulent labeling. 
 And so, *l  “follows” the probability distribution of *s  because it depends on which 
level of IP is realized. Because each realization of *s , is  is, in general, a function of F , 
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the effect of a small increase in F  on )),((* FFsll i=  can be decomposed into the 
“direct” effect, Fl ¶¶ /* , and the “indirect” effect, ]/][/[ * Fssl ii ¶¶¶¶ . Also, note that the 
condition for the profitability of false labeling, FsJ i ³- )(1 , depends on the monitoring 
intensity, a , but it does not depend on the likelihood of being caught cheating, ),( * isxq . 
This is so because of the assumption that only the ex post false labeling can be detected. 
Consequently, the probability that a non-IP product belongs to variety G affects not only 
the price premium but also the expected fine (see [12]). 
 The game played at the first two stages of the market-differentiation game remains 
essentially unchanged in the presence of false labeling. In light of (19), definition 1 can 
be regarded as a special case of false labeling equilibrium with FsJ i <- )(1  for all 
Ni ,...,1= . 
 DEFINITION 3. Given probabilities ip , Ni ,..,1=  where 01 >p , equilibrium in the 
market-differentiation game with false labeling is the tuple ),...,,,...,,( 12
*
NN llssx  such 
that  
fcxxcFxJ =-- 1
*** )),(]),(1(min[ p  (acreage allocation at time 1); 
),()]1/()1[( ** ii sxcFsx =--  (equilibrium with low level of IP at time 2); 
FlJls iii =- ))(1](/[ , if FsJ i ³- )(1  (false labeling is profitable); 
and ii sl =  otherwise  (false labeling is unprofitable at iss =
* ); 
where ],0( *xsi Î , and )1,[ ii sl Î  for Ni ,..,1= . 
 Note that it is not a requirement that false labeling be profitable at all levels of IP. 
Clearly, if false labeling is profitable at ** xs =  then it must be profitable at ** xss i <=  
as well, but not vice versa. Next is an investigation of some of the properties of false 
labeling in a partial equilibrium at time 3. 
Effects of Penalty and the Level of Identity Preservation  
on False Labeling in Partial Equilibrium 
Conditional on the realized level of IP, is , the share of the “ex ante” false labels, W , is 
given by 27 
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  ),(1),( iiaii lsqlsW -= .  (20) 
Analyzing (20), a useful finding is obtained. 
 Result 4. In partial equilibrium, the share of ex ante falsely labeled supply W 
(a) decreases when the level of IP increases; 
(b) increases (decreases) when F increases if )(/)1)((/)( ii lJFFs ¢-³<¶¶ . 
 In other words, two complementary means, boosting the level of IP and adjusting the 
expected penalty, are available to combat false labeling. However, an increase in F , 
anticipated by agricultural producers, may lead to a lower equilibrium realization of *s  
or *x  and therefore may actually increase the realized share of ex ante false labels. Given 
a particular realization of *s , is , the equilibrium share of ex ante falsely labeled supply, 
))(,( ii slsW , increases as a result of a higher expected penalty if the level of IP responds 
negatively and such a response is sufficiently strong. An increase in F  has two effects on 
the share of false labels, ))),((),(( FFslFsW ii . The “direct” effect, Fli ¶¶ / , is operative 
at time 3, and it unambiguously (weakly) lowers il . The “indirect” effect works its way 
through a change (either positive or negative) in the level of IP at time 2, Fsi ¶¶ / . If 
)(Fsi  responds relatively more (in absolute terms) to a small increase in F  than the 
inverse aggregate demand, )( ilJ , responds to a small increase in il , then the negative 
indirect effect dominates and the share of false labeling will rise at time 3. On the other 
hand, if is  increases when F  increases, then the share of ex ante false labels must always 
fall at time 3. 
Illustration of Effects of Penalty on Expected False Labeling  
 From (20), the expected (or average) amount of the ex ante fraud is then given by  
 å =-=
N
i iii
slssxWE
1
** )(/1)],([ p . (21) 
When the probability distribution of *s  is endogenous, the expected share of ex ante false 
labels, ][WE , is, potentially, a function of the following endogenous variables: *ip , is , 
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*x , and il  where Ni ,..,1= . It can be shown that equilibrium values of 
*
ip , is , and/or 
*x  
may either decrease or increase when F  increases. Leaving a comprehensive 
comparative statics analysis to the interested reader, I provide instead a simple example 
that illustrates both possibilities in the equilibrium with “contractual arrangements”. 
 EXAMPLE 1. Let both contractual and “spot market” forms of marketing variety N at 
harvest be used in equilibrium with false labeling. Furthermore, the functional form of 
the unit cost of IP is specified as follows: ecsxc c -=),( , if xs < , and ecxxc c +=),( . 
If (11) holds then it must be the case that 5.0* =p . Hence, the equilibrium share of acres 
sown to variety N is given by )21(* fc cecHx ---= . Then the equilibrium where false 
labeling takes place at 02
* >= ss  but not at ** xs =  is determined by 
)21(* fc cecHx ---=  (acreage allocation at time 1); 
ecFsx c -=-- )]1/()1[( 2
*  (equilibrium with low level of IP at time 2); 
FlJls =- ))(1](/[ 222 , where FsJ >- )(1 2  and 22 sl >   
(false labeling at 2
* ss = ); 
*
1 xl =  and FxJ <- )(1
*  (no false labeling at ** xs = ). 
The equilibrium level of IP when part of variety N is processed is given by 
 ),0()/()1(1 **2 xecxFs
c Î---= . (22) 
Differentiating gives 0)/()1(/ *2 <---=¶¶ ecxFs
c . Applying result 4 (part b), the 
expected share of ex ante false labels, ][WE , increases (decreases) when the expected 
penalty, F , increases depending on whether )1/())(()( *2 xeclJ
c --<³¢ .28 
 In example 1, ][WE  increases if the inverse demand schedule is sufficiently 
responsive to a small increase in the share of labeled products, 2l . It is interesting to 
explore why, taking the supply of variety N, *x , as given, the “low” level of IP, 2s , 
increases when the penalty, F , decreases (see [22]). Then, falsely labeling a non-IP 
product as type N appears more attractive (the so-called direct effect of a higher penalty 
on the profitability of false labeling). To bring down the incentive to exert dishonest 
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behavior, that dilutes the value of IP labeled products, IP retailers can be thought of as 
bumping up the probability that false labeling will be detected by raising the level of IP at 
time 2. Such “odd” behavior becomes more transparent once Fsxq ),( 2
*  is interpreted as 
the (average) cost imposed on non-IP retailers who falsely label their products at time 3. 
 In the next section, I investigate some consequences of pairing the ex ante goal with 
the ex post penalty. Keep in mind that the ex ante goal is to reduce the share of non-IP 
products labeled as type N. The ex post penalty is a penalty that is imposed on non-IP 
retailers who were detected supplying labeled products belonging to type G. One may 
wonder to what extent the results are driven by this peculiar pairing of the objective and 
the instrument. The goal of the next subsection is to demonstrate that the central message 
of this paper is not affected by that choice. 
Ex ante Penalty for False Labeling 
 Imagine now that the government or a monitoring private agency has the authority to 
penalize not only ex post false labeling but also ex ante false labeling. The amount of the 
fine charged to non-IP retailers who are detected labeling their products as type N is 
denoted by aF . Assume that the share of non-IP retailers who are spotted labeling their 
products as type N is given by ]1,0[Îb . Furthermore, hold that retailers are subjected to 
both types of inspection, ex ante and ex post. Assume that retailers pay the larger of the 
two fines if both inspections were successful in detecting the fraud. Then the combined 
expected (or average) per unit penalty for cheating is given by 
],max[)1()1(][ ababb FFqFqFqPenaltyE baabba +-+-= . 
For example, consider the case when aFF > . Then the expected penalty becomes 
aab FFFqPenaltyE bba +-= )(][ . 
It can be shown that the share of ex ante false labels, ),( ii lsW , can either rise or fall 
when the level of segregation, is , increases depending on whether 
)()1( ilJx ¢- )(³< aFb , where il  is now determined by  
aaiiiiia FFFsxqlJsxqlsq bba +-=- ))(,())(1)(,(),( .
29 
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 In addition, in the manner of result 4, it can be shown that a higher level of IP has an 
ambiguous effect on the share of ex post false labels. Therefore, in general, policy 
recommendations implied by programs oriented to minimize ex ante and ex post false 
labeling need not coincide.30  
 
Concluding Remarks 
 This paper presents an efficiency explanation of some of the observed patterns of the 
emerging differentiation in the agricultural bulk commodity markets. Incidentally, the 
possible source of uncertainty regarding the extent of market differentiation characteristic 
of the food supply chain becomes more transparent as well. Also, this paper demonstrates 
an intriguing possibility that the share of falsely labeled supply can increase in response 
to harsher fines. 
 However, the formal framework is limited in a number of ways. For example, any 
strategic behavior on the part of consumers prior to making consumption decisions was 
assumed away. The model also ignored any demand expansion or substitution effects that 
the presence of a cheaper GM food variety is likely to entail. In addition, the complex 
infrastructure of marketing channels and reputation incentives were not considered in any 
detail. A model that specifies the micro foundations of segregation and IP technologies in 
commodity systems likely would provide further interesting insights and useful policy 
implications.
  
 
 
Endnotes 
1. However, according to one industry survey in 1999, 11 percent of Midwest elevators segregated for 
non-GM corn and 8 percent segregated for non-GM soybeans. Still, only 1 percent and 3 percent of 
those elevators offered premiums for, respectively, non-GM corn and soybeans (USDA). 
2.  When identifying crops as non-GM, the tolerance level for the presence of GM material is of crucial 
importance. Even though a significant share of harvested acres sown to non-GM varieties is likely to 
fail to produce a “pure” non-GM crop, the gap between the shares of IP and the supply of non-GM 
varieties is striking. Also, the issue of contamination due to cross-pollination is of much less 
importance for some crops than for others (e.g., soybeans.) 
3. Premiums for non-GM corn and soybeans offered by elevators and grain terminals varied widely 
depending on location and proximity to export ports. However, only a small share of elevators engaged 
in crop segregation (USDA 2000). 
4. Overall, the evidence that GM varieties provide significant cost savings appears moot (European 
Commission 2000). Nevertheless, the motive for the rapid adoption of herbicide-tolerant and pest-
resistant GM varieties is not likely to lie on the demand side. 
5. Lin, Chambers, and Harwood (2000) conjecture that “rough ballpark figures” reflecting additional 
processing costs due to segregation could be as high as $0.22/bushel for non-biotech corn and 
$0.54/bushel for non-biotech soybeans (marketed from country elevator to export elevator) net of the 
grower’s premium. Bullock, Desquilbet, and Nitsi (2000) present an alternative, more conservative set 
of such estimates. 
6. Other papers inquiring into labeling of (food safety) credence attributes include Segerson 1999; 
Starbird 2000; Marette, Bureau, and Gozlan 2000; McCluskey 2000; Miller and VanDoren 2000; and 
Feddersen and Gilligan 2001. 
7. Other countries have taken an opposite stance on this issue. For example, in 2001 the UK rules stated 
that GM food had to be labeled unless neither protein nor DNA resulting from genetic modification 
was present. 
8. For example, see Segerson 1999 for a discussion of the use of this assumption in food safety models. 
9. Even though an individual food item derived from non-IP ingredients may be correctly labeled as non-
GMO, on average, non-IP retailers who label their products as non-GMO are committing a fraud. 
10. This approach fits broadly into the literature on credence goods and the equilibrium amount of fraud 
pioneered by Darby and Karni (1973). 
11. To focus on the market differentiation between the two varieties, food processing is taken to mean only 
preserving (or not preserving) food variety. 
12. Observe that this means that all consumers (weakly) prefer type N food. 
13. The cost differential may, in part, arise because of costly on-farm segregation of variety N. 
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14. The possibility of contractual arrangements between variety N growers and retailers will be discussed 
later in the paper. 
15. Note that it is assumed that the unit cost of on-farm segregation, nc , is not subject to production 
externalities, i.e., nn cxc =)(  x" . Relaxing this simplifying assumption will not change the central 
message of the paper. 
16. To focus on the information asymmetry at the consumer’s level, assume that the farmers do not 
attempt to pass variety G crop off as variety N when selling their crop to the IP retailers. However, the 
retailers who do not invest in the IP program gain nothing in terms of the probability of supplying a 
type N product by purchasing variety N crop. For example, this may be the case when the farmers are 
truthful with the IP retailers but always try to take advantage of the non-IP retailers.  
17. For clarity, Figure 2 depicts the game-tree when only two equilibria exist. 
18. The rather technical conditions for the uniqueness of IPCE competitive equilibrium will not be stated 
in the text. 
19. All the proofs not provided in the text are contained in the Appendix. 
20. Note that if all of variety N is grown under contracts, i.e., strategy (1) is uniformly abandoned, then no 
uncertainty with respect to *s  remains.  The focus here is on the case when all three marketing 
strategies co-exist. 
21. Note that the common beliefs by growers and retailers about the likelihood of a particular outcome 
may give rise to an equilibrium probability distribution. This mechanism of establishing the probability 
distribution of *s  will be used in example 1 below. 
22. The analysis to follow can be modified to consider the case when non-IP (unlabeled) products cannot 
be of type N but non-GMO labels can be false. This can be the case when the purity level required for 
a product to pass a non-GMO test is very high. Then the presence of GM substance in the non-IP 
products is inevitable and the approximation of the probability that a non-IP product is of type N by 
),(1 sxq-  cannot be used. 
23. Hold also that IP retailers will never be accused of false labeling. In other words, a law enforcement 
(monitoring) agency can only commit a type I error: failing to detect a fraud; but it cannot commit a 
type II error and accuse an innocent retailer. This assumption is relaxed in a number of papers (e.g., 
Kaplow and Shavell 1994). 
24. Parameter a  can be thought of as the probability of detecting a (ex post) false label by the monitoring 
agency when the label is false (ex post). The probability of detection is an important policy variable but 
it is taken to be exogenous during most of the analysis. One could hypothesize that the optimal 
monitoring effort can be a function of the share of ex ante false labels. The model will not be 
complicated in this dimension. For example, an inquiry into the relationship between enforcement 
costs and the optimal magnitude and probability of fines is presented in Polinsky and Shavell 1992. 
25. Due to the large scale of their operations, retailers also are held to rely on the law of large numbers 
when evaluating the probability of having a pure type N food product. 
26. Note that aq  is also the share of labeled products processed following the IP practices. 
27. To detect ex ante false labeling, the adherence to the IP production practices at various stages of food 
processing needs to be verified. 
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28. Also, sufficient condition of the form )1/()()( *xclJ -<³¢  ]1,[ 1sl Î"  can be used. 
29. A detailed analysis of the effectiveness of the ex post type of penalty in the presence of the ex ante type 
of penalty is left to the interested reader. I merely point out here that it is conceivable that increases in 
the effectiveness (a  or b ) or the size of the penalties ( F  or aF ) will not bring about the reduction in 
the false labeling that they could, were one of the measures (partially) abandoned.  
30. The objective to minimize the share of ex post false labels, ),()],(1[ sxqlsqa ×- , over s clearly is 
different from minimizing the share of ex ante false labels, ),(1 lsqa- , over s.
  
 
Appendix 
Proof of Result 1 
 Note that the derivative condition implies that )1,0(),( Î= cxxc  )1,0(Î"x . That 
being the case, the expected cost of IP in the no-randomization equilibrium is equal to c . 
Then one must show that there exist ),( * isx  such that ),(
*
isxcc > . Observing that one 
can choose 1p  arbitrarily close to 1, and that cxxcsxc i =£ ),(),( , where 
)1( fccHx --=  completes the proof. 
 
Proof of Result 4  
(a) 0/))(,( £¶¶ sslsW  ],0[1 xs Î" . 
Given the share of IP, s , the equilibrium share of labeled products, )(sl , is given by   
(A.1)  0))(1( =-- FllJs . 
Differentiating (A.1) gives 
(A.2)  
)(lJsF
F
s
l
s
l
¢×+
=
¶
¶
. 
Using (A.2) and differentiating ))(,( slsW yields 
ls
l
l
s
s
ls
s
W 1
)(
)/(
2 -¶
¶
=
¶
¶
-=
¶
¶
0
)(
)(1
£
¢×+
¢×
-=
lJsF
lJs
l
. 
(b) 0)(/})),(( <³¶¶ FlFsW  as )(/)1)(()/)( lJFFs ¢-³<¶¶ . 
Differentiating the equilibrium share of false labels at time 3 with respect to F  gives 
(A.3)  2/])/[]/([ lFlslFs
F
W
¶¶-¶¶-=
¶
¶
. 
Differentiating (A.1), taking )(Fss = , gives  
(A.4)   
)(
]/[
lJsF
sFFs
s
l
F
l
¢+
-¶¶
=
¶
¶
. 
Substituting (A.4) into (A.3) obtains 
-=
¶
¶
F
W
)/)((
1)(]/[
sFlJl
lJFs
+
+¢¶¶
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